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The burgeoning literature on how the benefits from research may be negative for a given price
support arbitrarily igfioresthe costs of price sUjlpQrts for a given level of.research.
FlIJithertttore, thevery existent:e ofprice suppoJitsls lnt:onsistent With thenormative criiericJn that
goveinments simply maximize social llitome. We show thatthere are always gains from
research, even if governments maximize sot:ial income subject to a farm income goal. Our
results are also consistent with the statements made by Schultz and Ruttan that ignoring price
sJ.tpports will result in all over (or Under) valuation of research benefits. Finally, we mdicate
that the predictions of the "no gains from research" literature may \lot be substantiated by
empitical evidence and that the ideal normative model should include endogenous farm income
levels as well.
June 1994Can.Price SUPPol'tSNegatctheSllCial Gains·l'romPubliC ·Jl~cb: EfpenWttlresin
Agriculture?1
.Two reCent papllrsin the Journal ofPublic Economics emphasize how commodity price
support programs redutethe social benefits from pUhlic investments in agricllifurairesearch
(Murphy, Furtan and Schmil'Z; Chambers and Lopez). Murphy, Furtan and Schmil'Z (MFS)
formally calculate the eonditions under which the "no-gaitlScfrom-research-point" (NGFRP) is
achieved for an exporter employingexpo'!t subsidies.··Chambers aMLoPez do likewIse for an
putllic ag:riCllltlJlral re"""rrh iJllcvestlIlellltsarenor only lower but alsoean be easily
negative with commodity policy.2
The policy implications derived from these papers are very significant. MFS and
Chambers and Lopez question both the Validity of past studies showing high returns to public
',..:: .< ':', .>;': •. ".,.
I1lsearchexpenditures aM why govermnentS continue to fivest in agricultural research. MFS
(I". 162) question the returns to research:
"Why ... continue investing· in agricultural research if the major impact.is
additional export subsidies? Are the results from past studies showing impressive returns
...·to I1lsearch still valid?"
Chambers and Lopez (I'. 74) argoe further:
"... [E]ven as it was argued that public agricultural investment was too low,the world
witnessed chronic overproduction of these protected agricultural commodities...
[A)gricllitura:l programs will induceanegaiivesoeial rate of return to public investment
... [C]urrent public investnIent levels in agriculture will be too high rather than too
low..."
Thispapetcriticallyevaltlatesthetnain thesis of this NGFRP literatUre altd comes to a
1 Helpful comments by participants in seminars at Berkeley and Davis are greatly appreciated.
2 The idea that commodity policy affects benefits to agricultural research expenditures is not new. For an
excellent synthesis and overview of this literature, see Alston, Edwards and Freebairn.significantly diffete~t cQtlcclllsion... We,.arllue thatp<llicy ~~fsshould.oot·be .advised·to
question the benefits from public research i~the presence ofprice supportprograms. This paper
shows that the .NGFRPxesult .doesnot hotd under a. brQftder an!l. as We .will argUe, more
appropriate framework. We analyze optimftlpubJicresearch expenditllre,s with price suPPQrts
under two alte,rnative assumptions regarding the.motive of govemm!illt: OJ maximize nationlll
incolIle (which is also the aSsumPtion in the NGFRPliterature);. and (2) maximize natiotlc;:tJ
always "gross benefits" from pUblic researchexpendituFes withprj>:e SUj'ljJorts, regardless Qf·the
~overtunent's motive. This means thatthe NG~~result defined specifica.Jly1'ty MFS illlver
holds.
We begin.by showitlg under the normatiw criterion of goyemments. maximizing total
income that price Supports cannot negate the benefits ofpuNic research expenditures. We aFlWe
that the NGF~ literature emphasizes the effects Clfprice supports on the benefits from .research
while ignoring the reverse.. Because research and commodity policy exist simultaneouslY,there
is no reason apriori to ca;!culatethe tlltU;rnS to research with commoaity policy fixed and thlin
not calculate the social costs of commodity policy assuming .research investments are. fixed.
With govertunents maximizing social income, we conclude that the olll)' consistent approach is
to calculate the social benefits (costs)ofeach policy on their own. One should therefore
attribute the social costs of price supports to the commodity policy itselfanli not to the public
researcl1 ittvestment. The implication isthat.there. is alwaY$ gains to research. .
Further, while the N<:IFRP literature• attribute·the idea to Schilltz and Ruttan, this may
be misleading. For example, Schultz (p. 586) states:
':Westem.Europe and Jllpan overpricefarmpf:o!lucts,.and as aconaequence the economic
value of research is thereby overvalued. The high internal pric.e of rice in Japan is a
misleading indicator of the real value the research adds to income'"
23
3 On the contrary, we argue that it is better to question the continuatiou ofprice supports than to question the
existence of research expenditures. Th<:re is a possibility of overvaluation ()f research benefits ifthe existence of
price suppOrtsi, ignored in the analysiS. But thiS dOes not alter our conclusion thilt there is always galns from
research.
This paper develops !:hese two perspectives On analyzing the implications of !:he twin
,',', - " - - , - -.<',',.,' -_:,' - -, , " ,',',',',' ,'. - - ,', - - ',', ,',,' ;'," '."", ,'. --,' "',',
MFS does not hold in this more realistic scenario.
policies ofprice supports and public research expenditures as fottows: !:he next section closely
evaluates !:he logic of !:he NGFRP literature and raises several issues regarding !:he pertinence
conrtnodity policy itselffulfIlls !:he same nonnative criteria. One has to ask why the conrtnodity
conclude that !:he unconstrained maximum of national income may not De the true goal of
governments.' We !:herefore develop a model of a government maximizing net social income - -', - -,' - -, - -,' ',,',' -- ,-',,,
We sh~w· that igrlPrmg price Stipp~when' calcUlating'be&fifS: fr6li:l f<isearch can generate
eitheranovervitluatki1i or an uridei:valuattonoftlte social bertetltS fiioiilresearch.·· However, !:his
is· shown to DeVttry diffe:rent froni concluding that the soCial'DenefitSfroni :research can' go
negative. We interPret the statements madeby Schultz and Runan to imply thateeon~mtstsare
not accurittelymeasurmg the ~nefits to'resear;;h wi!:h price supPoi:ts if!:he latter ate ignored m
the analysis. 'Wemitfufuill, hOwever, that mnoway clln one attribute the costsofpdce supports
to publiC researchtiXpeiiClitures Md conclude that it may not bil soCially benefiCial to haveitny
.Teseari:hexpenditures afli:U? .OUt andysis is therefore conSistent with thesmteIllentSIllOOe by
SchUltz and Runan:
.'Howeyer, if!:he true objectiveofgovel1llIlent is to.maximize national incOll;le, one would
not observe price policy in the first place. The nonnative question posed in !:he. NGFRP
literature is inconsistent; one cannot evaluate !:he social welfare effects of research with
conrtnodity policy in place and make nonnative statements as if the implementation of
" ,"" , ' ",',', - '-: ,',', -,' - - - ,
policy exists.in the fm~t place. The onlycurve shift.
of.this lilerat1;l~e's policy conclusions. 111~fi9n 3, we derive, theNGFR,fw\ierthemQre ,
realistic,(and,consistent) aSs.umptiOIl that ~ove~ents maximizene:t social income subject,to a
farm income goal. ,Tbe rest;ltsare that ~N9.FRP.,Ii\les not exist f.qr thegenelCal cast;. gt a
parallel shift inthe supply curve andis far le~s likely wder,thes~cii!l case (}fapiNotal supply
cQmpares tb~m t9 that Qfthe,NGFRP lit~a~re, Ideas, for further re~a!'(.\bprij;)riti~a~,l!!so
offered.
2. '"fhe Gainsfrom Agricnlt~alReseatebor the Costs froinDlStorted Trade;'?
We begin by maintaining the assumptiun ofthe NGFRP literature that the government's
Objective is.to maximize soci~lincome. The NGFRP literature evaluate; the effects Of price
supports on the benefits from research, taking tilt: price support as given and attributhtg changes
in social welfare to the research policy. Another approach would be to do the opposite and
evaluate' the costs'of price'supports, taking research expenditures as given.· Doesittn;tke a
difference whiCh way you look at it? Weshow in this section'that it d.oes, with important
, , , ,-" - - - --
implications for policy analysis. We then attempt todetennine which method is appropriate. . . . ~. . -. . .
We oonclude that inalyzlngthe effects of one pollcy (eg, research) while keeping the other
policy fixed (eg, price supports) generates misleading policy oondlusigns aod he~ce is an
inappropriate method'to analyze commodity and'research P6licy together.
FigUre 1 depicts the effect ofthe dual public policyofresearch expenditures and a price
support pi withexpcirt subsid.ies.'Research expenditUres caus<: the supply curve SolO pivot to
S,. This example is taken from MFS but we make several assumptions to keep the analysis
tractable in this section'ofthe paper: (1) there are no internatiotl:;\I tenus of trade effects (with
4either the price support or research expeilditiire's); ;ilia (2) there are no effectsofthe Price
support on the·deadweight costs ofraisiilgtax revenues and dlst~ning consumption. Ignoring
.terttis of trade effects implies that tfie world price 1'" is fIxed and·lgnorlilg deadweight costs in
consumption implies the doniestl:c demand·curve (not .shoWn) .is vertical. . Neither· ~f· these
assUiriptioris detract ftomthe objectives ofthis paperbut niereiy represent specific augmentations
oftfie analysis: 4
With respect to Figure 1; Alston, Edwards and Freebairn's analysis would take tfie
benefIts from research before price supports (area a) and subtract it fromth~benefits from
" Chambers. and Lopez statemoot(po 79) that th~ "te.!l!S of!tade ~ff<!l:t fl'luforces!h~likelillOOdoflmmisemlng
growth" is uilually trlieso we abs!taCt from the tei'ms ofttade effects·infuj.il s<:ction of the paper to simplify the
analysis in showing the logic ofout argumeuts. .... . .
, In very specific citewnStanees; it is possible fOt price supports to have a positiveeffect on the l1enefits from
research. In praCtical terms, however. most ofthe ~jor puce suppott schemes ill U.S. agrlqulmre.f9r the ~jor
field crops: dairy· and·sugar·sectors correspond to the case·where ·price interventions.in f'!vor offarnlers tend·to
decrease·ihe ·social benefits from·research. Consequently, there is an emphasis on the "no-gains' rather than the
"enhanced-gains' from research. ..
5SUrpltlS of.atea rr +b-H: ~d an increase in the costnopoQSUmer,ctaxpayets ofarea e + d.6·7
The net change in social we:lfareis atea,a+.b c IfWh,i¢:h"can be eil;Jlerposttiveornega,tive, The
no·gains·from·tesearch-point is when area.a+ b d (MFS; Chambers llfldLQNz), If;m:ad
column 6 of Table 1 in Alston, Edwards and Freebaim), The bot.tomline for. this literature is
", "".',- -'. -- ,'. ",", - ",' '..-;-:,./,',-,',-,/<" ::-,">,','" -; - ,'.:.,.,-- , , , '. - - ,,' ,',',",',-, ,',',',.- >" ,:. ',: ->,.: .:,:"",', ,' . .;.'.",',-,.. "
that price supports can affect research gains and when they do, it inevitably reduces the gains
_. - -,', - -".
to research and perhaps even resulting in negative gains to research (the latter emphasized by
'0"" ,,_.', , ',,'. -',',' --/,',_,',',',,',', ",', ,,'_ ,',", '.',"'.,' ".,', •• , ,',' ., ,,",' _ '",c. S', - - .',-- -', - ',' __ ',".",' _ '"
c + d, resUlting in a decrease in net social welfare consumer,ctaxpayer costs ate area e +
Table I). The. change in producer
MPS ,and 9I!ItllbetS and LQpez).8
. LetuS ~~wdli the,lipPlisite cifthe above alJalysis by assuming that'resear¢:h eKj)en(J;itures
ate fIXed and ltlJalyzethe sQCialw'elfate effeets !:If init!:ldi.lcing aprlce suppot't(seetionfJ$lin
surplusisarca e + b + e while the. change in
of area d. In this case, thete is: an uneq111vocal decrease in. social welfare. This result is the
,"'--'--- ','- _ ',',,_. ','-> .,' '..,,", ','S •.',,,'.•. ,',',,'.,', ••". "',,, ," ,,'
opposite to that obtained in the.NGFRP Itterature.
'WhiCh analysis is correct casstunmg theprice suppot't is givenand e'valuatethene!social
benefits (or costs) of introdlilcingresearch .el\.penpitures (as: in (AJ of TableU or the opposite?
One wayof getting out of this dilemma is to detertlline·which policy WaS ilttplementedfirst,
6 As inAlston; Ed~atas andFt~bairn . • ... ~oore the taXcosts ofresearch expendituttsthemselves
and the associated deadweightcoSlS oftaising taxes: the analysis ign<>res the fact that there !it\>declining
returns to research. For a: tulYre coinplet" modellricorpOtatm~ these feanJes...~ de O<>rter and ZilberIDaD.. '
1. !"atice in !'igurll,1 .tI1atwe.atbilrarily depi:Ctth.,..effecr lYfresear:ch tu pivot the supply Clll'VIl. •Whether thll
supply curve tI1ift is piVlYtal ar parallel is imrtJatetlal to the main pomt af this paper. 'Both types of tI1ifts are
discussed inMFS !lIld mAlston. Edwards and Freebairn, Alston, Edwards .and Froollairn asstnne ap:U:allel shift
Ee~~'~~l[:=i:}L;:F:~:i~\i:~i£~C:;;~'::~::s~i:i~·~,.,.t:e:~!:P1~~fi1~
, Chambers and Lopez show that there. are always no gains from rese:u:ch inthe case ofno export opportunities
for aprice support <:Um offeria purcIiroiescIieme.·regardless ofdie ilatUre of 1lie: supply Ctttve shltt. In terms of
Flgure·l, this me3i:i5t!nit Mea a'+bis allitays!ess fuan arei·d + h.· Chambers and Lopez state further ,lri their
section5 that tIiere always existsaNGFRP even with ttad~ possibilities, a.sllUittionshown to be exacerbated Ifthere
are any·(advetse)tetrns of trade effeclS'·associated with iIle sUrplus disposal.
6~CRtlse public researeh eKpendituresforagricli/ltUreitl the UniieaStatd, Was fIrst inllOOUcedby
Presilknt Lincoln in 1862wcbile price SUPpgrt legislati&nwasfrrst iftiplementedby Pteslderit
Roosevelt in 1933; one could easil;ycom:lude.thal [Brin Table 1 is the appropriate method'of
analysis. However, such adetermmationistmSatisfactory because both pUbli:c poli:ciesare
obserVed simultaneously inthe past sill: dooades and somust fiOWC be analyzed jointly rather than
recursively in eithere;>; past or ex (l;flte analysis: 9
.'...Anpther possible.wcay of getting out ofthis logjam is to evaluate the wcelme effects of
both policies jointly. Prooucer surplus wcith neither research eKpeooitUres norpricesupporis is
al'ea gwchite consumel'ttaxpayer costs m zero. ·lritrodticing bOthreselrtchexpenditures and pilce
supports increlts/iS prMuoor sUrplus byareae + a + b + cand constimet/~payet coSts by
. " ," , ,'_ i _, _ <_ ,'- - ; - ,', _ _ -'. _ - - - ,.,' - _, '," __
areae+ b + C + d.. The net change in social wcelfare is area'a. d which can be either positive
or negative. Tills outcome: is expected because: price supports'rntroduce wcelfal'e losses While
research expenditUres are socially ooneficial. However, such an analysis does not inform public
poliey makers as to the source of the: costs/benefits from each policy type, rendering this
approach to be inadequate as wcell.w
·WeargUe that; urtder the assumpttan oJgovernments' ffUlXimizing social fnc'Ome, the omy
possible way tOlinltly~ the welfare effects ·of price Snppot'ts and research,eKpenditUres is to
evaluate the social costs (benefits) ofeach policy assuming the other policy is set at its level that
maxiftiires social income.· This allows one to overcome the dilemma faced illeild'r ofthe above
3 paragraphs: Research eKpendirntes with no price supports generates anet social gain ofma
• (Jovemrnenls Cll1lSUllltly adjust both policies over tiine. It is possi!>le, however, to argue that policy-tllllkers
mustdedde (5il reisear~ wi1Jlout having any control over price supports. Bur such l!tl aPproach to policy llifvlce
must·be·recoilciled With how eoonotri!s(s' should advise ~ome'other policy tllllker who is deciding on price supports
(tuld apparently has no contmlover research pOlley). .
'0 Other possible appmaches were considered like the average Or the difference in the net soci:lI costs between
[A] and [B] in Table l. However, neither appmach was found to be satisfactory.
7awhile.l'rice·sU:flP'1rts with tc)ptimal re.~atCll e:Xip~.f1l'lil:.tlres g~net~tes· a m~t'Social loss ~f areaet.
pril'e s1;lPPQrt~ cannot negate.the silcialgaitls frowreseatch.in agriculture. . The only wt,t)' one
Cll!!;attribute ~he sOl'illl costs oftwo government polieies empJpyed. at the same time to a single
policy.(while.maintaining theaSS\:lmptiQnilillt thego~ermtle,nt'sgplll is only to maximize social
welfare) is toid~nt;fy the rOot .Clluse. of.the deadweight costs. It is the. implementation of
commodity policy alone that generates deadweight costs. The policy combination ofzempaee
S1;lPPQrtsand.positive research expendjtures gea.erates the la+gest possible net SQcialincome of
'" .- "-, " ,', ,".-.',',,', '.,-,- '.- ,,-,- ,'", - - """, .,- - ',', - - - ,'- - - '. - -
!'e:yqgestiQU remains, how~yer,. about the validity of the. remarks by lluttan and
SchUltz regatdingthe overvaluation of research benefits wh~ jgnoringtl:te existence of pLice
supports. In fue case.ofa price support withexport subsidies infig1;lre J; ignoring the existence
of.the price sUPP'1rt program.by eq1;lllting the.ma\;!'e! priGce to the S1;lpportprice will overstate the
benefits from resellrch by the area /) + c. Calculating the social returns to research while
ignoring the existence ofprice supports will therefor,e automatically overstate thehenefjtsfrom
research. This is our inte\;pretlltion ofthe meaningoUhe remarks made pySi;hultz.llttdRuttan
when they atg1;led that pace supports overvalu{? the benefits.from research. This cooolusion
" - -- -', - , - ,-',', .', - - - '" , -- ,- - - '. " " -,' - - -', - -- - " " -,'
however, is quite different than.that of the NGFRP Uterature whiGch shpws how social welfare
decreases and perbl,lps becomes negative. with researcll expenditures fora giveI\ price &1:lflPtlrt
.
regime.. OU.r approach has the social gaitlsfrom research.neverto be negatel'i!;lypriceslJPP0\'tS,
We int.etPret Ruttan andScbultz as notattributlng tl;1e costs Qfp.r!Ge.st;pport&.llgaiust ~ebenefits
II Chambers and Lopez appeal to papers by Bhagwati and Johnson on immlserl:iling JlroWlh. A r~duction in
social income occurs with e:xxxgen()fjS growth in the BJ:1J1gwati-Johnson models. .~o.genolls growth is il;key
distinetionllI;Gause it underscores tj)e k.ey difference inthe p<;>licy .concl~ion .ot.this lileramre co.f!Jllllf"d tothat of
the NGFRP LIteratUre;. namely, the costs ofmarket distorttons (due to ll;comm<Jdil)l policy liketarif(RYmcreaJll>swith
growth such that national income may decline. Therefore, governmentS should·roduqe .th€i level ofthe commodity
policy distortion, not the level of the public good research expenditUre as implied 1>y the NGFRP literature. Sec
also Alstonand Martin for adifferent critiqueofChambers and Lopez' self-proclaimed lin!;:.to the·Bhagwati-Johnson
literature on immlserizing growth. .
8ofresearclr(unlitethe NGFRP literature).·
Note however that iliecondusion:by Schultz and Ruttan onhow price supports overvalue
the benefits. from rese~rch is not uriiversal. Take the case ofa production quota ma closed
economy depicted in FigUrez. The truelfilderlymgsupply curve IS So' Calculatingtlte social
benefitS ofresearch to tie the uppershaded area assuming (mcorrectly) that the observed market
9
The discussion so far in this paper and in the NGFRP literature assumes thllt the
maximizing social welfare to the
However, the fixed price support policy
inconsistency in applying the nonnative criterion
-,.,.,- .. ""."..." "'" :< -'.. -'.,---_.
government's objective is to maximize social inc:Ol1ae.
price Po is the competitive market eqUilibrium price (and that ilie supply curve is 81) uiulersttltr!s
thesoeial gairi& to research (which should be prapetlymeasured as the lower shadid area in
" Oml'·in·very s;>eciafcitcinnsfutlces "an·corilln6ditypo.licy .increase.the .sdelal.benefits from research •(see
column 6 of Alston, Edwards and Freebairn). Hence, commodity policy generally involves deadweight costs.
just that the socilll costs ofcomm6dity policy
are bigherwith l:esearch and that the benefits from research may be (under) overstated if one
does not recognize that price supports eJ>ist. But the returns to research cannot be n~gative.
.. <:- <;:-:.',.- ".,' ,:
expenditures and price supports are policies being implemented by the same polity. The
itSelf generating deadweight costs, is inconsistent with this .government objecdve.13 Research
discussion mthe previoUS sectionand in the NGF~ literature con~illS' therefore, a fund~entl!1
" This non,universat 3S!,Yect orRuttan's and Schultz' over versus under-valuationofresearch benefits with price
suppo.rts is different than the l1on,universaiity ofAlston, Edwards and Freebaim's colu!lll16 in their Table I. For
each case in Figure I and 2 ofthis paper, Alston, Edwards and Freebaim have a negative sign in column 6 oftheir
Table I.
3. R.esolvlng the Dr. <lekyU apd Mr. Hyde View of Governmentdetermination ofresearch policy, while maintaining a govermnlmt POlicy ClfptiCl<\ supports'fhat
, . ", ',-', -','- - - -, '. - - '.- -- - .
.initself does.not fulfill .t1lls.criterion.. Analyzi~gtwo pl!.blk: policies, eacitw,illt.a different
nopnative criterion but the.same gl>vermnentis really a.Dr. .Jeli0'U a:nd Mr, Hyde.vieW oJ
govepnnent. It imPlies fIlat the g()~enfis try4Jgto ioorease.soc;iai welfalie.using resea:reh
expenditures and decrease sociaL welfar~ u~in$ price supports. .In order t().llvoidthis
inconsistency, we. develop a rn()del in which. govermnents use 1:lolhresearcb and cormnGldity
policy to maxirn~e sociaiincome while sati~ing a farm in.come. oonstrltint.
14
. It is.very
onfqr agricultural economists to
,',' ',',.," ','/,'-',', ,'" - ','.' ,-,'.,' ',' -'.',< - ,'';-,.'-', ':'.'>.' "','-
c()nsider an expon
offarm pQlicyin the context of
.see Gardner).
d0!irestic pricepi to:bQth
farmers and consumers. Define r as gross research expenditures. Producer sutplus(pSJ,
consumer sutplus (CSJand taxpaxer expenditures (T) are affected 0Y each policy mstxurnent:
CS = CS(pt, r) and = T(P', r)
- -- -
As defined by MFS, the gross annual benefit fF arch (GARBJ is the .
gross increase in total income net of deadweight costs (excluding investment costs);
(Z) GARB =. ,iPS + ,iCS - ~T
where,i refers to the changes induced by research expenditures r. As in MFS, we will consider
the case of both a parallel··and pi\;otal shift in the supply curve due to public research
expenditures. With a patanel shift in the supply curve, we find that GARB is always positive
t4 What we are in effect arguing is that the calculation of a NGfRP OulY mak~s sense if one assumes the
government is ma1Cimizing income subject to a farm .income goal.
10when ltcllfeV:lng a farri1 income gnal.is In the case ofa pivotaf~lJiftin the supply curve, we
find that GARB isfar less Hkely to b~ negativethah that calculated by MFS.
Parallelsupply shift .
, ,,' - ,-, - --
Consider a.price support P'a in Figure 3 that acbieves a fannincome gQal equal to area
. - '. - - -',' ','.' --- - .,' ,. .-'., - - >", -- ,.,., "> '" -".',->/",_.- - ',', '.', ,:. '" ,', - ,<.',
EGL. Given the dQll1estic supply and demand curyes So and D, respectively, the resulting
"" ,',_'__ '." .".',', - ,', ,",'", ,', ',',,',;, " " ,';, ,',' 'i"- - " - ',',' -_
domestic supply anddeI!land .is Q'oand Q"o..Define the producer surplus that achiev~sthefann
income goal as PS* ."" (P:o- pmo)(Q'oI2). The worlq market pri~pwoisdetermined in panel (0)
of Fi~re3 ~y the~tersection cifthe excess supply curve ESo and the excess demand curve ED.
'Expo~ volume 'is Qe& a:d.export subsidies equal (P~G- pw0)0"0 corresflonding to area ABCD..
The introduction of research expenditures shiftsboth.the supply curve (to S,) and the
excess supply curve (to EST)' Ifthe domestic price support is maintained at pta' then producer
surplus increases by area GIML. The price support is therefore reduced to P', in order to
maintain the fann income goal of PS* (now area JHM).' Domestic production is unchanged at
this new domestiC price (Q', "" Q'o). Because domestic consumption increases, exports fall to
Qe,. The per unit export subsidy also declines from (pto- PWo) to (P, - PW,). This means total
export subsidy costs are reduced from area ABCDto area NORS. Consumer surplUs increases
by tile area EFKJ: The welfare gains to both taxpayers andconSumers guarantee that GARB
,,", ,"', -' ,'" - -', - ,-'. -,' - - - - - - , - -;.' -- ',', ," '. .'." -
is positive lind so the NGFRP does not exist.
Pivotal supply shift
As before, the lower support price pt, maintains prooucer surplus PS* now equal to area
JHL in panel (a) of Figure 4. The pivotal shift in the supply curve resUftsin an increase in
production even though the support price has declined. Domestic consumption increases too so
15 MFS argue that researchers generally suppOrt the finding that supply curves exhibit parallel shifts in response
to technical change.
11demand functions as:
Sa(I') = Q'(P) = (P - pm)/a ..
D(p) = Q~P) "" (P' - Pjll'
ED(P) = Qd.(P) = (pt • P)/'Y . .'.'. - ,.' '",' ',- """" , -'" --, , -
(3a)
(3c)
the net effect onexportvolumc is ambiguous and depends on the relati~ size ofthedemand and
supply increas~. Ifthe domestic demand functioh issufficiently elastiC~lative to the ,domes~ic
supply function, then exports will decline. A decline in export volume would also reduce the
per unit export subsidy, in which case total export subsidies would unambiguoUsly decl~.
GARB would be unambiguously positive in this caSe and again theNGFRP doeS not exist.
However, GARB ispossi6ly negative only whenthe increase inoutputIs greater than the
increase in demand. This speCific case is depicted in Figure 4. Expi:lrtvolume increases from
'Q'oto <Q.~; tesultingin the wi:ltld market price t<7 decline tl;} 1""',. As both the SUppl;}rt price and
the worldmatket price decline, the per tinit export sUbsidy tan eith,et il1Cteas~ or decrease,
depending on the elasticities of the excesssuppjy :ilId demiHld functions.'
Toderive the condlfimts under WIDth export sUbsidy Costs increase, define the supply and
where Ct, I' and 'Yare the absolutevalues ofthe slopes of the inverse supply, demand and excess
demand curves, respectively whilepm,'px and pz are the interceptson the vertical axis for$esc
same functions. The specific welfare measures can be written as:
(4b) PS = (P' - pm)'12Q1
12to tne faim iticome constralnt,it follows thattiPS/dr ==
(5) dP'ldr == - <5(P' - pm)/2a
where <5 == da/dr. Therefore,
Because P; > pm, conditions (6a and b) indicate that both domestic demand and supply increase
with research expendirures. Condition (6c) shows that export volume increases if the demand
m'lrk,~t equilibrium condition determines how research
(7)
Equation (1) shows that the world priee will decline only ifexport volumes increase. dearly,
the decline inworld prices will be larger with more inelastic demand curves (both domestic and
foreign) and a more.elastic supply curve.
The effect of research on the per unit export subsidy is:
(8) d(P'-PW)/dr == (-yOl2a)(P' - pm) [(I/a) - (11/3) - (I/'Y)]
13The peruni(export subsidywill increase itand 01llY if[(1la) ~ (l1fj) ~ (II'}:')] > O. Al)increase
in per unit export subsidy is more likely wim a more elastic supply curve and a more -:' ' " - - '' __ - "_,' - ,__ -__:'. - ,<- '>,-"/,'.,, ,,", <_.-"_""",-./,,,.;' 'c"".',, .,>-'.:"",_,,':.,,-->..;.,
inelastic domestic and foreign demand curve. Similarly, we canshow how research affectstotal
export subsidies:
(9) dTldT == (o/2a)(P' - P'"){(PZ - PW) [(lfa) - (11(3) - O/y)] +(t" - P"') [(lIa) - Om)]}
which yields me following condition under which total export subsidies will increase:
, ":' - ,:, :
(10) dTldr > 0 iff (P' - pW)[(1la) • (Ufj)· (1/y)] +(1)' - Pw) [(lIa) - (1!{J)] > 0
The first term in (he RHS of condition (10) repreSents me change in per unit export subsidies
while the second term represents me change in export volumeS. When both are positivi, totil
export subsidies increase. However, total export subsid~ ~osts can eimer increase or decrease
when export volumes increase and the per unitexport subsidy declines. Notice however mat me
reverse is not possible.
Even iftotal export subsidy <:Osts increase, me W:rease will be, h>wer than in me MFS
analysis. The increase in exports in our analysis less than mat in MFS be<:ause the reduction
in the support price results ina lower increase in bOth production and COI1$umption; MFS
assume that the support price does not cha11ge, leading to an increase in total,export subsidies
-- - - / - - - - "" '- - - "" ',' - " - ,<,' - -, ,'.':' .:',: ,,-,," ,",'
ofthe area BCDVUT in panel'~)'ofFigure 4. Employing the same methodology as before, we
can derive an expression for how research affects total export subsidy costs in the MFS
framework:
(11) dT(MFS)ldr == (Ola') [(t'z _ PW) + (pt - P"')] .'
where T(MFS) is total export subsidy costs in the MFS framework. Condition (11) indicates
14tI'lattatal export subsidies intheMFS fral1'lewark always increases. Total export su!>sidiesaftef
tlie supply·shift in llie MFS framework exceed total export subsidies in our iirilllysis by the area
·... Sa far, we I'la~e evaluated the impact ofresearch expeniliUires 6n tbtal export sUbsidies.
To evaluate tlie total social welfare effects (I.e. GARB), one needs to include tlie effects on
domestic consumer and producer income. In"our framework, producer surplus is llnaffucteq
while consumer surplus increases by area EFKJ as prices fall and consumption increases:
" "," ,'- ',' - - - • .', '-,,", ',' - / ',' ."" ---»" ,-, ,'", -,'
(I2) dCSfd1' ='(bla13)(F~Pt)(PI~ pm) '" 6QdQ<
GARB is negative in our framework anly if·tbemcrease in total export ~bsidies exceeds the
- - -- -'" - /,' - -- - -- ,,- ',,', .', - ,',.,,' -, -,' ',: --, ' - - ',' ',',,' ',' '" .'.' - ',', ,',' -
increase in consumer surplus. Using (9) and (12) and denoting. the absolute values of the





, respectively, it follows that:
where z '" Q'/Qd is the self:suffiCiency ratio and NRP '" (li' - PW)/pW is the nominal rate of
prdteetian. This·indicates that GARB <0 is possible in our frameworkifthe domestic supply
elasticity is large comparedto both demandelasticitfes: .GARB is more llkely negative when the
seif-sufficlencyratio is larger because the Unpact on domestic consttmer surplus isrelativelyles:S
important!
On theother hand, the MFSframewark ofanalysis i:tlls.no change inconsutrier prices (or
welfare) but producer surplUS increases (by area GILifl panel (a) ofFigure 4). It follows that:
(14) GARB(MFS) < 0 iff eS > [(1 + NRP)/(1 + NRPeE)]/2
15affecW"d by the,domestic demandelasti9it:y, In,additjon, tl,leconditii>ll is easierto satisfy bellause
the RaS of(14) is only halfofthe first term ofthe RaS ofcondition (13), \mplyittg thaumder
all (relevant) circumstances qARB(MFS)is,significal)tly smaller(andlessJikely:)£hantheGARB
in our framework.
Empirical Evidence
The above analySIS shows that the NGFRP does riotexis~With a parallel ~trift i~ £he
supply curve. 'A NGFlW is possible with'a pivotal shift in the,sU.p{>ly curve orily ifexports
increase with research., lSven then, we show fdrrnallythat the NGFRP in out framework is far
leSs'likely and thatGAiUJ. is low~rthan that cafculat~ by MFS. '
Finally, it is instructive £0 evaluate the predictive capabilities of the NGFRP'literamre
as well. MFS sUIDll1arizetheir findings (p. ,,,,,~,,
•...[WJe show why producers are likely to supportR&D activities since protection shifts
the negative effects via ex:portsubsidies to taxpayers. It is generally true that producer
grl;)UpS in cou.ntries,with, .high; pt:ice, supports and export subsidies support R~D
, actiVities..." "
Is there etrlpirical,evidence that agricJ,llmral sectors with mgh levels ofprotection also receive
, ''',',',' '" ,', - - " ,', ,-- , - ,",", ",','.'.", " -/' ,- .,,"-,' - ' " - '" --, - -" ',', ,,-, -,
RaJ,lsser shi>W that the ratio ofpUblic gi>od expenditures teprice sU'p{>l;)rt sUbsidies is lowest for
sugar, milk:, rice and wheat (8.6, SA, 6.9 and,,15.7 per~nt, respe9tively) and .highest for,
soybeans, beef, poultry and pork (291, 125, 286 and 38Q percent, resp~tively). The sectors
with high,Price supports ,are,getting (aIKf perhaps demanding) ,relatively much" Il.;s:s R&D
.'.,.. ',',' ,',,',.',','/' ",,',. ,,' ,',' 'p',',.,' '.' ,_ ',.','" ",,,' P""" ,,_ ,_,'~~i "~"'~'" "',,. '.•,,' ,',:-,,-:.'.; ., ,'"" "~' .',,,,
in pUblic research is much higher in the crop sectors (i.e. wheat) with high price supports than
in the livestock sectors (i.e. beef) with low price supports. Furthermore, de Gorter and
16Zilbettllaipresent the stYlized fact that research financed privately by farmers is higher in
sectotswillimore .Hastic demandcunies; These sectors hive much lowerprice supports rellitive
to llie inela:stic demand sectors sucliils sugar, milk, rice imd wheat. Together, tl1is ev/i:lence
does liot corroborate the predictions made'by MFS. .This .lends further support for the
hypOthesis put forward in tl1is paper that governments clioose relatiVe leveis6fprice suppOrts
and researcb expenditures to.maximize social'income subject to a farm income goal.
4. Implications and COl\cluding Remarks
The burgeoning literature onthe jo~t detemJ:inationofresearchand pricesuP}lortpolicy
in agricultnreelIlphas~eShow price supportsreduce the benefits from research (Alston, Edwards
and Freebaim; MrS; Chambers and Lopez). Indeed, t~s literature notonly questions the
conventional wisdom that governments underinvest in agricultural researcQ but also questions
research efforts in the first place. The social benefits may be negative, leading MFS (p. 162),
. for example, to argue"...why continue investing in research? .." and Chambers and Lopez (p.
74) tostate i'...current p:ublic inve.stments levels inagflctrltnrewill be toohigh rather than too
.' '. - _ i _ - ''.' - - _ ,', _ _ _", .', __'. _ _ _ - _ . - " ". _ _ _ ,'" - _ - _ ,',_
low..." The analysis in this paper arrives at a significantly different conclusion. Under the
',,', - - -- - ,.,." .'p' " •.',,:>.'."_._- . ,-', ,,:-' ,', " - -
assum}ltion ofgovernments maximizing social income,wefind thaLprice supports c~ot negate
the benefits from research. This is because the NGFRP literature arbitrarily evaluates the effects -, - -,', - - .',' --,',".'. ". -, ",',; -,' -,". '-- -" , '''.' .',,',' ,'-,.'
ofcommodity policy given researcli and not vice-versa (see Table 1). . . ..' . .. ,- . . . . ' ,
We go on to argue that a NGFRP calculation makes sense only in a model of
governments maximizing social welfare subject to a farm income constraint. The observed
behavior ofgovermnents employing price supportsis now consistent witli.the normative criteria
evaluating its efficacy. .The results indicate that the NGFRP does not exist for parallel shifts in . . - . ." -. ~. .:.. . .. .
the supply curve and are far less likely for pivotal supply curve shifts than in the MFS analysis.
. '. . .. ~.
Furthermore, the GARB is higher in those cases than that in MFS. These results are particularly
17qnpOrtaIlt, given the cortunitment by the Current .ad1ninis~tion m Washington.to make .mote ','" -,<- ,', _.', -, " _ -> - -" - _ .-_- '. -- .' _--- _,', ,', _ ,','.-,.' ,'......' ',.'. ,'- " ',,', ,','. _,',' ,'/,',',',' ',','.' ',',', ',,' - ',,', - ". " ;." -, '- --',', -,'", ',' - - ,,' - -,', -"-', ,
prodljctive mvestwents.to itnprove theinfrastructure and undedyingproductivityOJ'theAmerican
_ - _.'/,_.> _,- .'i>,<:-" " .. ,',',", ,<- 'i';,··"", ",'" " .'.,' - ,', ,',','"., ',,-, ,-- - -,,-
economy. The cQnclusion.of this paper isthiit exis~g ptice ~upports shm:l!dnot dererpolicy-
, ,- - """ " - - " ,. - - " , .', - , " c," ,'" ,,',',', - _,-,,' ,,'" " - . - ,,- - - - , ,,- - - - - - - - _ - -, .
makers from exploitmgthe high returns to public research ex,pel1ditures in agticu,ltnre, regardless
ofthe. motives·of goyermneIlt. We .alsoindica~ lhiittbe predictions made by MFS on which
agriculturalsectors demand (or receive) more publiec R&:.D eJ>penditures may notbe corroborat~
,','.'., ,,','_",',','i/" .',,'- - -/,' /.','._.-/--'<, <,-,,',...'._',' /."', ,',,',',' ,',","" " '.' ",""'" ,
by empirical evidence.
Further re~earch should generalize our anilyslsto inClUdeGteadweightcilsts of tllxatiQn
iricltision ofthese featureswill notafterthe ove~~ll im~licationsofoutp.,rsPectlvesgiven in this
paper on govermnents choosiri.!; both· pri~e supports·and public good reseateh expenditures
compared to me NGFRP literature.
A moreiniportant pri6Tityfuffurther reseateh is to relax the assumption that the farm
income goal is eltogenous. AlthQUgh~ fixed farm income goal isa more realistic and consistent
Yis that not only
are the two policy instruments endogenous (pt and t as developed in this paper), but the farm
income g~al itself isetldogenous as well. The plausibility of such an hypothesis can perhaps
best be explained by examining the politi~al response . the intrOduction of bST il1 theU:S.
dairy sector. bST is pUrPorted to be able to reduce production costs sulJstalltially yet farmers
and pOliticianshave tesponaed OVeithe years by trying to ban it (~tate govermnentsinWisconsin
arid Vermont have bee~successful with suchprono~ncements in the past). Wh; would farmers
insist on suclla ban·if price supports protect farm income?
..The reason is that consUlller/taxpayer costs ofthe price supports increase such that it may
be necessary to reduce the pri~e supporilevel. This may reduce farm income, particularly if
18an inelastic demand.
of lprOl:}UGition anti/or taxj:>ay,er Gosts.
pr'l'ldu:cer surplus may in Gognizant
Relaxing this assumption ofa fixed farm inGome goal
to the realities facing poliGy-makers. Are social benefits from public research expenditUres with
price supports in agriculture evenhigherwith endogenous farm income goals, thereby rendering
~" ,;:';;:::::::>': ,;:-;-:::>:;:.::"::::< :':>_::.::
the NGFRP even more less likely?16 The answer to this important questiOn llwaits further
16 The literature on endogenous economic policy has also recently recogniZ!'d that governments employ both
redistributiveand growthpromoting jJOllcies in tandem.F6rexllffiPle'see<the eXeellenlpaperhyAlesinaand Perotti
who argue that distributive policies largeted to reduce income inequality allow governments to expand growth
promoting public investments.
19TABlE 1
"Th.. G'ain;'homAgrioulturai Resei'r~h" or "The Cctt!its £roin Disto'rted Trad~~?
[A] "The Ga.ins from Agricultural Research under Distorted Trade"
Pdce Support Given
(1) Research expenditures = 0
c
+ d
producer surplus = g + e (see Fig, 1)
consumer/taxpayer cost e + b
(2) R~sea~cl1 ej,pebditu.ns > 0
. . '" .'. .
NET EFFEGT OF RESEARCR,'EXFEN,lll'l'URES '(PR!CE SUPPORT CIVEN):
change in producer surplus = a + b + C > Q
change in consumer/taxpayer cost = c + d > Q
net change in social welfare = a + b - d >,=,< Q
[BI "The Cost:s from: 1!listorted Trade under'Agricultural Researoh"
Research Expenditures Given
(1) Price support = 0
produc..r surplus = g + a
consumer/taxpayer cost Q
(2) Price Support > 0
producer surplus = e + g + a + b + C
consumer/taxpayer cost e+b+c+d
NET EFFECT OF PRICE SUPFORT (RESEAROH EXFENDITURES GIVEN):
change in producer surplus = e + b + C > Q
change in consumer/ta>tpaye,r cost, = e + b, + C +. d > Q
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